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RETHINKING CIVIL-LAW TAXONOMY:
PERSONS, THINGS, AND THE PROBLEM OF
DOMAT’S MONSTER
Eric H. Reiter

∗

Since the time of Gaius, whose Institutes divided private law
into persons, things, and actions, the categories of persons and
things have enjoyed an implicit (and sometimes explicit) primacy
as the summa divisio within the private law. Though the third
category–“actions” in Gaius and Justinian, today reinterpreted as
“obligations” or “ways of acquiring property” 1 –has by now
perhaps outstripped the others, “persons” and “things” continue to
have pride of place in civil codes, and by setting up legal subjects
and legal objects, respectively, they make possible the law of
obligations in which persons and things interact.
Gaius’ structure–and its implicit hierarchy–has cast a long
It still provides the basic architecture of
shadow. 2
the civil law–sometimes explicitly, 3
sometimes
more
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I would like to thank Olivier Moréteau for inviting me to present these ideas
at the Civil Law Workshop at LSU, and the workshop participants for the
discussion that ensued. My arguments also greatly benefited from the comments
and suggestions of Jean-Guy Belley, Nicholas Kasirer, David Lametti, Rod
Macdonald, Desmond Manderson, and Shannon McSheffrey.
Earlier
unpublished versions of this article were awarded prizes by the Fondation du
Barreau du Québec, the Quebec chapter of the Association Henri Capitant, and
the Association des professeures et professeurs de droit du Québec, and I thank
these organizations for their recognition and financial support.
1. See Peter Stein, The Quest for a Systematic Civil Law, 90 PROC. BRIT.
ACAD.: LECTURES & MEMOIRS 147, 156-57 (1995) (discussing the early-modern
developments). In what follows I will use the term “obligations” except in cases
where the historical category “actions” is specifically meant.
2. See generally Donald R. Kelley, Gaius noster: Substructures of Western
Social Thought, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 619 (1979).
3. For example in Books 1-3 of the French Code civil (Des personnes; Des
biens et des différentes modifications de la propriété, Des différentes manières
dont on acquiert la propriété) or Books 1-3 of the Louisiana Civil Code (Of

190

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 1

subtly 4 –and for this reason it is unlikely to disappear any time
soon. Even in the common law, the influence of this structure is
evident in Blackstone’s Commentaries and in the recent English
Private Law, to name just two examples. 5 My purpose in what
follows is recast the dichotomy between persons and things as a
problem not of classification (what goes where) but of the
construction and function of legal categories as normative spaces
within which classification takes place. To do this, I think we need
to replace a static view of legal categories as discrete pigeonholes
with a dynamic view that emphasizes their interactions. This idea
of interaction is crucial, I will argue, since legal categories do not
exist in analytical isolation. Rather, they are in tension with each
other, their fluid and contingent boundaries continually being
renegotiated, with meaning coming out of this process of give and
take. Human interactions themselves are inconceivably complex–
what William James called a “great blooming, buzzing
confusion” 6 –and a static view of legal categories as boxes labeled
“persons,” “things,” and “obligations” belies this complexity. My
point is that the blurring of the boundaries between categories is
not a failure of taxonomy, but a valuable tool for enriching legal
analysis and bringing it into closer alignment with human
experience. 7
Two puzzles of categorization–one recent, the other historical–
can serve to introduce and illustrate my point about the importance
of an interactive understanding of legal categories.
Both

Persons; Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership; Of the Different
Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things).
4. For example in the General Part of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (which
begins with the divisions Persons, Things/Animals, and Legal Transactions) or
in the Preliminary Provision of the Civil Code of Québec (“The Civil Code of
Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human rights and freedoms and the
general principles of law, governs persons, relations between persons, and
property”).
5. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1765-69) (1979); ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW (Peter Birks ed., 2000).
6. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 462 (Frederick H.
Burkhardt et al. eds., 1981).
7. See generally STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:
CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING (2003)
(discussing blurring and overlapping of categories in judicial reasoning in the
common law).
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underscore some of the difficulties in negotiating the boundary
between persons and things by putting into the foreground the
constructed and hence normative nature of legal categories.
The first puzzle comes from an unusual news story.8 John
Wood of South Carolina failed to make payments at a self-storage
facility, and found his possessions had been sold at auction in
North Carolina. Another man, Shannon Whisnant, purchased a
barbeque smoker at the auction, and found when he brought it
home that it contained a dried-out, severed human leg–Wood’s leg,
in fact, which he had lost in a plane crash some years before, had
hung on his fence to dry out, and was keeping so he could be
cremated with it after his death. Whisnant, who said he was
“freaked out” by his find, called the police, who confiscated the
leg. But Whisnant quickly had second thoughts, realizing, a bit
belatedly, the profit potential. With Halloween coming, he began
charging people for a peek inside the now empty smoker, $3 for
adults, $1 for children, and he sought to reclaim the leg to improve
gate receipts.
The dispute quickly became legalized, with each side groping
for legal vocabulary to characterize claims that fell into the gray
area between persons and property. Whisnant asserted a property
right, claiming that since he had bought the smoker and its
contents, he was now rightful owner of the leg. Wood on the other
hand called this “despicable,” and asserted a personhood claim: the
leg–though currently detached–was integral to his plans for postmortem bodily reunification. 9 Sensing trouble–he no longer had
the leg, remember–Whisnant suggested a joint custody
arrangement, the details of which unfortunately did not make it
into the papers, but which in any case Wood refused. The police
sided with Wood, but on property rather than personhood grounds.
They gave him back his leg because, by their way of thinking,
“The guy don’t have a leg to stand on:” Whisnant had given up
ownership when he surrendered the leg to the police. 10 In the end,
perhaps inevitably, the affair left behind the realms of personhood
8. Up in arms over a leg, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, October 4th, 2007, at A2.
9. In many ways this is a real-life analogue of the hypothetical “case of the
stolen hand” discussed in JEAN-PIERRE BAUD, L’AFFAIRE DE LA MAIN VOLÉE:
UNE HISTOIRE JURIDIQUE DU CORPS 9-16 (1993).
10. Amputee gets leg, princess wins case, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, October
6th, 2007, at A2.
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and property for a different branch of law: obligations and
contract, as the parties agreed to settle their dispute before the
cameras in the television courtroom of Judge Greg Mathis. 11
Judge Mathis opted for personhood, or did he? Wood got his leg
back, but Mathis ordered Wood to reimburse Whisnant $5,000 for
the cost of the leg. 12
My second puzzle is more serious in intent but it touches the
same problem of the tension, even the competition, between the
categories of persons and things. It comes from the seventeenthcentury French jurist Jean Domat. In his 1689 treatise The Civil
Law in Its Natural Order, in the course of his discussion of the
status of persons resulting from nature (rather than from law),
Domat lists a number of liminal states to illustrate particular
analytical problems. 13 Domat’s list includes children born dead,
children still in the womb, premature children, posthumous
children, hermaphrodites, eunuchs, the insane (Les Insensez), the
completely deaf and mute, and those suffering dementia or other
mental deficiencies (Ceux qui sont en démence, & dans ces autres
imbécillitez). The list ends, however–most interestingly–with
“monsters that do not have human form” (Les monstres qui n’ont
pas la forme humaine). Domat writes: 14
Monsters that do not have human form are not considered
to be persons, nor are they counted as the children of those
who give birth to them. But those that have the essentials
of human form and just have something extra or something
missing count like other children.
Although monsters that do not have human form are not
considered to be persons nor to be children, they count as
such with respect to their parents, and they are counted
among their children for the purposes of any privileges or
11. Eric Connor, TV judge to decide who gets amputated leg, USA TODAY,
October 10th, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/offbeat/200710-10-amputated-leg_N.htm (last visited Novemeber 6, 2008).
12. TV judge rules South Carolina man can keep amputated leg, but must
pay $5,000, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, November 1st, 2007, available
www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/01/america/NA-ODD-US-Abandonedat
Leg.php (last visited Novemeber 6, 2008).
13. 1 JEAN DOMAT, LES LOIX CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL 11-13
(Luxembourg: André Chevalier, 1702). The list that follows translates as
directly as possible Domat’s terminology.
14. Id. at 13 (author’s translation).
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exemptions granted to fathers or mothers according to the
number of children.
Both Domat’s monster and Wood’s leg are taxonomic puzzles
because they fall squarely between our categories of “persons” and
“things.” Wood’s leg clearly has a dual nature–a money-making
commodity to Whisnant, a severed part of himself to Wood.
Domat’s monster, though it appears in the discussion of persons, is
explicitly not a person, but a taxonomic riddle that challenges the
integrity of legal categories and the binary either/or classificatory
decisions that taxonomy is normally held to require. I would like
to leave aside the severed leg for the time being and look more
closely at the problem of Domat’s monster and its implications for
our understanding of the workings of legal taxonomy.
Domat is not alone in his discussion of monsters. In his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, for example, Blackstone
writes:
A MONSTER, which hath not the shape of mankind, but in
any part evidently bears the resemblance of the brute
creation, hath no inheritable blood, and cannot be heir to
any land, albeit it be brought forth in marriage: but,
although it hath deformity in any part of its body, yet if it
hath human shape, it may be heir. This is a very ancient
rule in the law of England; and its reason is too obvious,
and too shocking, to bear a minute discussion. 15
Blackstone’s modestly veiled reference at the end of this
passage is fleshed out by his source, Bracton, writing in the more
brazen 13th century:
Who may and may not be called children and reckoned as
such. Those born of unlawful intercourse, as out of
adultery and the like, are not reckoned among children, nor
those procreated perversely, against the way of human
kind, as where a woman brings forth a monster or a
prodigy. 16

15. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at book 2, chap. 15 (vol. 2 at 246-47)
[orthography modernized].
16. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND 31 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans. 1968-77).
Blackstone also cites Coke, who repeats Bracton’s remarks. See EDWARD
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Ultimately, all these discussions trace back to Justinian’s
Digest, where both Paul and Ulpian discuss the status of monstrous
births, 17 and beyond that to the Laws of the Twelve Tables, which
stated (characteristically laconically) that “a dreadfully deformed
child shall be killed.” 18 The evident discomfort behind these
remarks relates to long popular traditions regarding unusual births–
for example conjoined twins. On the one hand, such children were
historically associated with presumptions of the sexual impropriety
of their parents, specifically with bestiality. On the other hand
they were held to be portents of disaster and divine disfavor. 19
Clearly, popular opinion, at least, put the monster’s status as a
human being in doubt, and the law followed suit in its hesitance to
treat such children as persons.

COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 7.b, 29.b (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler
eds., 1853).
17. Dig. 1.5.14, in THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (Alan Watson trans. & ed.,
1985):
Paul, Views, book 4: Not included in the class of children are those
abnormally procreated in a shape totally different from human form, for
example, if a woman brings forth some kind of monster or prodigy.
But any offspring which has more than the natural number of limbs
used by man may in a sense be said to be fully formed, and will
therefore be counted among children.
Dig. 50.16.135, id.:
Ulpian, Lex Julia et Papia, book 4: Someone will ask, if a woman has
given birth to someone unnatural, monstrous or weak or something
which in appearance or voice is unprecedented, not of human
appearance, but some other offspring of an animal rather than of a man,
whether she should benefit, since she gave birth. And it is better that
even a case like this should benefit the parents; for there are no grounds
for penalizing them because they observed such statutes as they could,
nor should loss be forced on the mother because things turned out ill.
18. XII. Tab. 4.1, in 3 REMAINS OF OLD LATIN 441 (E.H. Warmington
trans., 1961).
19. See David Cressy, Monstrous Births and Credible Reports: Portents,
Texts, and Testimonies, in TRAVESTIES AND TRANSGRESSIONS IN TUDOR AND
STUART ENGLAND: TALES OF DISCORD AND DISSENSION 29 (2000); ZAKIYA
HANAFI, THE MONSTER IN THE MACHINE: MAGIC, MEDICINE, AND THE
MARVELOUS IN THE TIME OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (2000); and DUDLEY
WILSON, SIGNS AND PORTENTS: MONSTROUS BIRTHS FROM THE MIDDLE AGES
TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1993).
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Domat’s monster is something of a test case, an exception to
prove the rule. It is a problem deliberately posed because it
challenges categories, while at the same time having a certain
practical importance. 20 But how does the monster fit into Gaius’
paradigm of persons-things-obligations, a structure that underlies
the work of all of these authors? Domat, in treating the monster
under persons, follows the Digest, which puts the main discussion
of the case of the monster under the title “Human Status,” thus
emphasizing the monster’s nature. Blackstone, however, puts the
monster in his book on the rights of things; he is less concerned
with what the monster is than with what the monster can and
cannot do (namely, inherit). This point is crucial: where we start
the analysis in large measure determines where it will end up.
Domat gives us some hints as to taxonomy by bringing forward
issues that remain implicit in his Roman sources. Following Paul,
he says specifically that monstrous births that do not have human
form “are not considered to be persons” and are not counted as the
children of those who bear them. 21 Those with “the essentials of
human form,” by contrast, are considered to be the children of their
parents, though Domat does not say whether or not they are legally
reputed to be persons (most likely they would be). Again
following the Digest, this time Ulpian, Domat recognizes the
difficulty of this position, since such children “count as [children]
with respect to their parents,” and so they are considered to be their
children for the purposes of privileges and exemptions dependent
on the number of offspring. 22
At this point Domat breaks from his Roman sources and adds a
footnote that changes the terms of the question. He notes, “We can
add, as another explanation for this rule, that these monsters are a
20. As is amply demonstrated today by the difficult moral, legal, and ethical
issues raised by the separation of conjoined twins. See the fascinating English
case Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) No. 1, [2000]
H.R.L.R. 721 (England, C.A.). For commentary on this case, see especially
George J. Annas, The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life: Lessons from
Cannibalism, Euthanasia, Abortion, and the Court-Ordered Killing of One
Conjoined Twin to Save the Other, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1275 (2001); the
symposium in 9:3 MED. L. REV. (Autumn 2001); and ALICE DOMURAT DREGER,
ONE OF US: CONJOINED TWINS AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORMAL (2004).
21. DOMAT, supra note 13 at 13. Compare Dig. 50.16.135, which suggests
the opposite.
22. DOMAT, id.
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greater burden than other children.” 23 This note changes the terms
of the discussion in an interesting way, because we get a hint of
exactly what rides on the solution to the taxonomic question of
what the monster is. Domat’s footnote moves us in a very
different direction: it presents a situational definition of the person
that points out the tensions between taxonomy and the social
function–in this case the human needs–of what is being classified.
I will come back to this point shortly.
Still, we have not answered the question: if these children that
our pre-modern forebears viewed as monstrous are not persons (or
if they are persons only imperfectly and for specific purposes,
rather like slaves in the antebellum American South), 24 what are
they? According to the logic of Gaius’ schema, they must fit
somewhere, since the tripartite division is an exhaustive structuring
of the private law–as Gaius put it, “All our law is about persons,
things or actions.” 25 These children would seem not to be things,
which Domat defines as “everything that God created for man,” 26
but since Domat divides things into those in commerce and those
not in commerce, perhaps monsters without human form (and also
Wood’s severed leg?) might be things not in commerce. 27 Indeed,
there is evidence that in England parents or others sometimes
exhibited such children for profit, and these cases periodically
came before the courts of common law or Equity. Though not
23. Id. at 13 n. x (On peut ajoûter, pour une autre raison de cette regle, que
ces monstres sont plus à charge que ne sont les autres enfans). This point
occurs neither in the Digest nor in its medieval gloss, and seems to have
originated with Domat. It occurs regularly in the other editions of Domat I have
examined–for example in (Paris: Aux dépens de la Société, 1745), vol. 1, p. 13
and (Paris: Nyon, 1777), vol. 1, p. 19–but confirmation of its origins must await
further study of the earliest editions of the work.
24. Slaves were non-persons in some situations, persons in others, threefifths persons in still others. See Malick W. Ghachem, The Slave’s Two Bodies:
The Life of an American Legal Fiction, 60 WM. & MARY Q. 809 (2003).
25. G. 1.8, in THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS 23 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson
trans., 1988).
26. DOMAT, supra note 13 at 16 (tout ce que Dieu a creé [sic] pour
l’homme).
27. Compare BAUD, supra note 9 at 78-88 (arguing that the human body
should be considered a thing not in commerce rather than a person). Baud cites
the Digest on monsters as well; id. at 71. See generally ISABELLE MOINE, LES
CHOSES HORS COMMERCE: UNE APPROCHE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE JURIDIQUE
(1997); and Grégoire Loiseau, Typologie des choses hors du commerce, 2000
REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 47.
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surprisingly the courts did not deal explicitly with the question of
classification (though as always the issues are there, in the
background), the results suggest that these children were viewed as
being outside the market, for moral if not taxonomic reasons. In
the 1682 Chancery case Herring v. Walround, for example, a
“monstrous birth” (conjoined twin girls) was shown to the public
for money, and the exhibition continued even after the children
died. The Chancellor reportedly “most disliked these Doings” and
ordered the body (bodies?) buried forthwith. 28 Treating Domat’s
monster as a thing–even a thing not in commerce–would however
seem to be at odds with Domat’s remarks about the esteem of the
parents and the care that such children require, which point in a
different direction, towards the language of relationship and
obligation, and thus to the third branch of Gaius’ schema. While
the monster is not itself an obligation (though how do we
conceptualize obligations without in part reifying them?), it clearly
engages that aspect of the law. By its very nature the monster
embodies dependence on others (its parents, society more
generally), and so it elicits bonds of relationship and
interconnectedness that call for a situational understanding that is
at odds with the more ontological analysis characteristic of the
categories of persons and things.
The examples of the monster and the severed leg illustrate the
difficulty in isolating and circumscribing the physical world (not to
mention the world of human interactions) so as to make it fit neatly
into a single preordained category. Domat’s monster is neither a
person nor a thing nor an obligation, and yet it is all three at the
same time. Wherever we might put it, it reaches into (or holds
onto) the other categories, claiming aspects of all of them. Even
concentrating on the summa divisio of the paradigm and limiting
the choices to either a thinglike person or a personlike thing is
insufficient, since as Domat indicates the relations between such a
child and others are crucial to its nature. Moreover, the monster
simply points out in starker relief what is true also for everything
we subject to legal analysis: in different aspects and from different
points of view everything partakes of all three categories, and so
defies the neat categorization that Gaius’ schema as classically
conceptualized demands.
28. Herring v. Walround (1682), 2 Chan. Cas. 110, 22 E.R. 870 (England,
Ch.) (“A monstrous Birth shown for Money, a Misdemeanor”).
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I would like to turn now to a closer examination of Gaius’
schema and the function it and legal categories more generally
serve in the civil law. Gaius divided the world of private law into
persons, things, and actions, and in so doing he created the three
fundamental categories of the civil law. But by this he also–and
this is my point in what follows–necessarily posited the existence
of boundaries between the categories–points of contact where one
category gives way to another. Categories have a seductive effect,
however: like black holes, they tend to pull things towards their
centers, leaving their edges, as well as their interactions with their
neighbors, as ill-defined areas of discomfort. In what follows, I
want to turn attention away from the middles of the categories and
focus instead on the boundaries between them. In so doing, I hope
to shift our understanding of legal classification away from a
process of binary, either/or decisions that place material in the
appropriate pigeonhole and towards a more dynamic model that
emphasizes the interactions between categories such as “persons”
and “things.” I am particularly interested in the possibilities of
rethinking the category of persons, since I believe it has not been
given its due, at least in part because it tends to be on the losing
side of binary taxonomic decisions. Exploring the dynamic
interactions between categories can, I think, reclaim a space for the
person against encroachments by its neighboring categories, while
at the same time add dimensions to the concept of the person that
have been underemphasized or ignored in the law. Since the civil
law is an integrated system, rethinking persons necessarily
involves rethinking things and obligations, as we will see, though I
leave it to others to explore these implications.
I. BOUNDARIES
Gaius’ taxonomy privileges a view that something must fit into
one and only one of the categories, and distinct sets of rules are
engaged and different legal actions made possible depending on
where something is put. Since the system is exhaustive, Domat’s
monster, for instance, must be either a person, or a thing, or an
obligation. No fourth option exists (like the categories “others” or
“et cetera” beloved of common lawyers), 29 and no straddling of
boundaries is possible. This is not to say classificatory problems
29. See WADDAMS, supra note 7, at 11-12.
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do not exist. Roman jurists long ago pointed out difficulties–
Ulpian, for example, noted that the household partook of both
persons and things, depending on the point of view from which it
is examined. 30 More recently, we can point to the examples of the
corporation–which can be seen as a person in status, as a thing in
relation to its shareholders, and as a nexus of contracts
organizationally 31 –or of profitable biotechnological innovations
derived from the human body. 32
The logic of legal classification is still however largely driven
by an understanding of the boundaries between categories as clear
lines necessitating either/or choices–difficult choices, to be sure,
but choices nonetheless. We see this in the logic of civil codes,
which locate different issues in distinct books, and in legal
education, which in the civil law world usually mirrors the
structure of codes and treats persons, things, and obligations in
separate courses and in separate textbooks. The effect of this is to
keep the categories conceptually insulated from one another:
viewing them as boxes within which to file legal data puts the
emphasis on difference rather than on overlap and connection.
In the case of Gaius’ schema, the tendency is to view it
according to the structure of Gaius’ Institutes, and so as a series of
binary oppositions arranged in a linear fashion, first persons then
things and finally actions (now obligations):
Persons

Things

Obligations

This linear view creates two interfaces between categories, and
scholars have recently begun exploring their implications: the
30. Dig. 50.16.195.1, supra note 17:
Let us consider how the designation of ‘household’ is understood. And
indeed it is understood in various ways; for it relates both to things and
to persons: to things, as, for instance, in the Law of the Twelve Tables
in the words ‘let the nearest agnate have the household.’ The
designation of household, however, refers to persons when the law
speaks of patron and freedman: ‘from that household’ or ‘to that
household;’ and here it is agreed that the law is talking of individual
persons.
31. Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate
Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J.
COMP. L. 583 (1999).
32. E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS (1996).
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persons-things interface 33 and the things-obligations interface. 34
This sort of relational thinking is welcome, since it begins to make
Gaius’ static structure more dynamic, but the either/or binary
oppositions in this view are too limited to deal with the sort of
taxonomic mixing that cases like Domat’s monster bring up.
If we loop the linear paradigm around into a circle, we create a
new interface between persons and obligations, which gives us a
place to analyze issues such as the relationships raised in Domat’s
footnote mentioned earlier:

This does not fully solve our problem, however, since the
system still breaks down into a series of binary either/or pairs.
This third–and still shadowy–interface between persons and
obligations is important, even crucial to understanding the system,
since it brings into the analysis issues of relationship that are
otherwise left out. 35 What is needed is a model that incorporates
the multi-valence and fluidity of all three categories, a model that
33. Besides the other contributions to this workshop, see especially
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?–Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); BAUD, supra note 9; Radhika
Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000); and
MARGARET DAVIES & NGAIRE NAFFINE, ARE PERSONS PROPERTY? LEGAL
DEBATES ABOUT PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY (2001).
34. E.g. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131
(1970); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001).
35. See the fascinating article by Catherine Labrusse-Riou beginning to
explore this interface: De quelques apports du droit des contrats au droit des
personnes, in ÉTUDES OFFERTES A JACQUES GHESTIN: LE CONTRAT AU DEBUT DU
XXIE SIECLE 499 (Gilles Gouveaux et al. eds., 2001).
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can account for the constantly shifting analytical alliances between
them.
I would like to suggest that we can approach a visualization of
the dynamic view of Gaius’ paradigm that I have in mind if we
think of the private law not as the usual spectrum, nor even as a
circle (with obligations linking back to touch persons), but rather
as a triangle, where classification takes place within the area
enclosed by the triangle, rather than along its perimeter:

Persons

Things

Obligations

This model, I think, makes it clear that Gaius’ schema
represents a closed system, embracing the private law. 36 At the
same time, I believe it provides a more realistic graphical
illustration of the interrelations between all three categories than
does the more familiar linear model.
Each point of the triangle, then, represents one of the
categories, either persons, or things, or obligations. As we move
towards the center of the triangle, we get a more and more
balanced mingling of all three categories–we might think of the
blending of three colors at the center, rather than sharp lines
dividing three zones.
Interactions primarily between two
categories take place close to the sides of the triangle, while
36. The ambiguities and difficulties of classification between public law and
private law are significant in themselves and require analysis, but are beyond the
scope of this article. It seems clear that an interface does exist between private
and public law (one thinks of the fluid boundary between delict and crime, or
between the private and public aspects of fundamental rights and freedoms),
though representing this interface graphically presents challenges (what is the
area outside the private law triangle: public law? non-law? both?).
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relatively unproblematic examples of each category would be close
to the triangle’s points. 37 For example, we might place things
without an owner (such as wild animals) at the extreme point of the
things category–though clearly things and so within the private
law, until occupied by an owner they do not interact with
persons. 38
I do not want to push this kind of structuralist modeling too far,
but I think it does offer at least two heuristic advantages. First, it
brings into play the third interface between persons and
obligations, and so it allows us to bring ideas of interaction and
relationship into our legal concepts of persons and things, rather
than isolating them from these ideas. Second, it makes it clear that
all three of the categories play a role in virtually any classificatory
decision: as I just indicated, it is extremely rare that something
will unproblematically belong to one and only one category,
without influence from the others.
In other words, this model can help move the process of legal
taxonomy away from the empiricism of simple either/or choices
and towards a rhetorical and normative process of constructive and
constitutive interaction between different areas of legal knowledge.
Though binary oppositions might be cognitively easier for the
mind to grasp, the addition of a third option–particularly one in
dynamic relation to the others–opens up additional analytical
nuances and possibilities. Our legal categories are fictions 39 –they
37. I do not want to suggest that moving towards the triangle’s points
moves us closer to essences or archetypes. All three categories–persons, things,
and obligations–are juridical constructions that work normatively to structure
legal problems and subject matter rather than as strictly empirical labels.
Instead, moving towards the points of the triangle reflects a decreasing intensity
of interrelations with the other categories. For an insightful example of the
analysis of the normative implications one of the categories–persons–see Ngaire
Naffine, Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects,
66 MOD. L. REV. 346 (2003).
38. In passing, one might ask whether the other two points of the triangle–
persons untouched by things or obligations, and obligations untouched by
persons or things–are conceptually possible. Obligations, it would seem, are
not, since by definition they involve both persons and an object: see e.g. 1
ROBERT-JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITÉ DES OBLIGATIONS in ŒUVRES DE POTHIER 79
(nouvelle édition 1821). By contrast, persons, or at least human persons, are
inextricably linked to other persons (if not to things), which gives rise to certain
natural obligations linked to status (as between parent and child).
39. See Yan Thomas, Fictio legis: l’empire de la fiction romaine et ses
limites médiévales, 21 DROITS 17 (1995), discussed in Alain Pottage,
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have a long pedigree in the civil law, of course, but they are
fictions nonetheless–and it is essential to ask what we are calling
on our fictions to do and how well they are doing it.
Reconceiving Gaius’ schema as interactive has important
implications for understanding the person in law, as it forces us to
shift our attention from ontological status (is something a person or
a thing?) to how it is positioned or embedded within a social
matrix of relationships–a concern central to the feminist critique of
traditional views of personhood in law. 40 At the same time, by
focusing on the interfaces between the categories and on the
interactions that take place at these zones of juncture, we can begin
to counter the colonization of one category by another, which is an
inevitable byproduct of binary taxonomy and clear boundaries
between categories. The category of persons has I think long
suffered encroachments by its neighbors, each of which deals with
matter more congenial to the liberal model of law: objects of
wealth on the one hand, and means of acquiring objects of wealth
on the other. I would like to turn now to look at these issues in the
context of the persons-things interface.
II. THE PERSONS-THINGS INTERFACE
The traditional view has been that there is (indeed, that there
must be) a clear boundary between persons and things, which
corresponds to the distinction between subject and object, being
and having, the self and the world. 41 Given the anthropocentrism
at the heart of liberal humanism, this boundary is regarded as
central to, even inherent in, the nature of human society. 42

Introduction: The Fabrication of Persons and Things, in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY
AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS 1, 1218 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2003).
40. See especially Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, 1 YALE J.
LAW & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Property in Potential Life?: A
Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 343
(1993); and ROBERT LECKEY, CONTEXTUAL SUBJECTS: FAMILY, STATE, AND
RELATIONAL THEORY (2008).
41. See generally Pottage, supra note 39; and Alain Sériaux, La notion
juridique de patrimoine: brèves notations civilistes sur le verbe avoir, 1994
REV.TRIM. DR. CIV. 801.
42. See generally DAVIES & NAFFINE, supra note 33, at 2; Ross Poole, On
Being a Person, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 38, 46 (1996); and DONALD R.
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Disagreement largely centers on the placement of this boundary
(particularly in areas like the status of embryos or fetuses 43 or
biotechnology 44 ) rather than on its existence. Conflict arises from
(or at least is exacerbated by) the fact that the nature and location
of this boundary engages so many different normative discourses.
Law, religion, science, ethics, and morality each address the basic
question of what is a person and what is a thing, but give widely
divergent answers to it.
In practice, however, the boundary between persons and things
blurs. In some contexts, human beings are effectively treated as
things (for example as objects of the power of the state or of
employers), 45 while sometimes certain things are (or conceivably
should be) treated as persons or parts of persons (such as human
body parts, 46 or objects with particular emotional connections to a
human being, 47 or certain animals, 48 or things of common benefit
like the environment 49 ). The problem is that in a system with a

KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 8 (1990). This is of course a hotly contested question, which has
inspired a vast literature. For one challenge to this anthropocentrism, see
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL
PLURALISM (1987).
43. See e.g. Robert Kouri, Réflexions sur le statut juridique du foetus, 15
R.J.T. 193 (1980); Martine Herzog-Evans, Homme, homme juridique et
humanité de l’embryon, 2000 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 65; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Rights of Embryo and Foetus in Private Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 633 (2002);
and Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to
Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005).
44. See e.g. GOLD, supra note 32; Alain Pottage, Our Original Inheritance,
in LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING
PERSONS AND THINGS 249 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2003).
45. See e.g. Anne Barron, Legal Discourse and the Colonisation of the Self
in the Modern State, in POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION
AND THE DEATH OF MAN 107, 109 (Anthony Carty ed., 1990).
46. BAUD, supra note 9; and Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against
Property Rights in Body Parts, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 259 (1994).
47. Radin, supra note 33, esp. 959-61.
48. Alain Roy, Papa, Maman, Bébé et… Fido! L’animal de compagnie en
droit civil ou l’émergence d’un nouveau sujet de droit, 82 CAN. BAR REV. 791
(2003); and Simon Cushing, Against “Humanism”: Speciesism, Personhood,
and Preference, 34 J. SOC. PHIL. 556 (2003).
49. Stone, supra note 33; and Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist
Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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clear boundary between persons and things, a choice must be made
for one category or the other, which amounts in most cases to a
choice between treating something as extrapatrimonial or
patrimonial, as outside or within the market.
Our liberal Western world grants property discourse
tremendous power to transform our view of what constitutes a
thing and in so doing to colonize other areas of law. Personhood
discourse, by contrast, has largely lacked countervailing power,
both because it has been less coherently theorized and because its
characteristic concerns are less easily translated into the language
of law. For this reason, the negotiation between the categories of
persons and things has generally taken place from the standpoint of
the latter. 50 John Austin argued a century and a half ago for the
logic of viewing persons as exceptions to universal reification
rather than seeing things as exceptions to universal agency, 51 and
the comparative historical fates of the law of property and the law
of persons bear this out. In cold instrumentalist logic, whatever
can be treated as a thing is treated as one, unless there are
compelling reasons to the contrary (which generally derive from
the anthropocentric bias just mentioned). 52 Even with the abolition
of slavery, the most egregious commodification of the human
being, the patrimonialization of aspects of the person–one thinks of

50. Compare C.B. Macpherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, in THE
RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER PAPERS 76, 84 (1985), who
argues that hitching other concepts (such as human rights) to the power of
property might be useful in establishing them.
51. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAW 686 (5th ed. by Robert Campbell, 1885): “The Law of Things in
short is The Law—the entire corpus juris; minus certain portions of it affecting
peculiar classes of persons, which, for the sake of commodious exposition, are
severed from the whole of which they are a part, and placed in separate heads or
chapters.”
52. An early critic of this was Louis Josserand, La personne humaine dans
le commerce juridique, D. 1932.CHRON.1, 4.
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privacy, 53 image, 54 body parts and genetic information 55 –has
worked towards the assimilation of persons into things. In
common-law jurisdictions this is perhaps unsurprising, as the
concept of the person in the common law has steadily atrophied,
which leaves the courts little choice but to designate as property
anything that has no more obvious category. 56 But even in the
civil law the power of property rights makes them a beacon for
litigants, and the extrapatrimonial is increasingly becoming
patrimonialized. 57
Boundaries constantly move, which means categories are fluid.
Given the central importance of both persons and property in
Western liberal and humanist ideologies, defining what happens in
the zone of interaction between the categories of persons and
things becomes crucially important.
It makes a profound
53. For an early discussion of privacy as a form of intangible property, see
Note, Modern Developments of the Jurisdiction of Equity, 7 COLUM. L. REV.
533, 534 (1907), cited in Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the
Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29
BUFF. L. REV. 325, 334 (1980). The recasting of certain aspects of privacy as a
form of property right continued in William L. Prosser’s influential article
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
54. In the United States, though there were earlier antecedents, the line of
cases interpreting the right to one’s image as a proprietary right begins with
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), which established the “right of publicity” in
American law. See generally Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony:
Comparative Perspectives on the Right to One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673
(2002).
55. GOLD, supra note 32. See also the famous decision in Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. S.C. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 936 (1991).
56. See Eric H. Reiter, Gaius, le droit des personnes et la common law
anglo-américaine, in 2 PERSONNE ET RES PUBLICA 163 (Jacques Bouineau ed.,
2008).
57. An example is the legal status of clientele (particularly a physician’s
patients), which has been the object of vigorous debate in France. See Thierry
Revet, Clientèle civile, 2001 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 167; Judith Rochfeld, Les
ambiguïtés de la ‘patientèle’ ou comment une chose qui n’en est toujours pas
une peut désormais constituer licitement l’objet d’un contrat de cession…,
J.C.P. 2001.I 301.432; François Vialla, Un revirement spectaculaire en matière
de patrimonialisation des clientèles civiles, J.C.P. 2001.II 10 452.69. On the
patrimonial/extrapatrimonial distinction, see generally Grégoire Loiseau, Des
droits patrimoniaux de la personnalité en droit français, 42 MCGILL L.J. 319
(1997); and Reiter, supra note 54, at 681-705.
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difference in the character of a legal system whether classification
proceeds from the basis of the primacy of persons or the primacy
of things, and different justifications are required for each.
The problem with allowing the category of things–and more
particularly the concept of property–to set its own boundaries is
that property today is largely conceived in market terms: courts (if
not individuals) deal more comfortably with things considered as
wealth valued in monetary terms than with things considered as
unique objects valued subjectively. 58 This insulates the category
“things” from both the personhood concerns of the category
“persons” (which touch on subjective value) and from the
relational issues of the category “obligations” (which touch on
responsibility and duty), both of which potentially bring to our
analysis of things important concerns not captured in market
calculus. The ostensibly universal logic and language of the
market make property seem the great equalizer, a vulgate into
which virtually anything may be translated. The normative
implications of this process are too important to be accepted
uncritically.
Even our language for taking things out of the property system
presupposes evaluative market language as the norm. 59 The very
linguistic form of concepts like “extrapatrimoniality,” “not in
commerce,” and “inalienability” presents them as exceptions to the
predominant paradigms of “patrimony,” “commerce,” and
“alienability” respectively. The association between things and the
market is so close that it seems somehow perverse to say that there
might be things that are “not in commerce” yet still property. This
is particularly so with regard to the person and the rights closely
connected to personhood (such as privacy, bodily integrity, and so
forth–the extrapatrimonial personality rights of the civil law 60 ).
Though not all alienability need be market driven, 61 and though a
patrimony also theoretically contains things of value that are not
58. See generally Bernard Rudden, Things as Thing and Things as Wealth,
14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81 (1994).
59. See Alain Pottage, The Inscription of Life in Law: Genes, Patents, and
Bio-Politics, 61 MOD. L. REV. 740, 765 (1998) (noting that “to create or defend
an exception is to concede the claims of the rule”).
60. See generally Adrian Popovici, Personality Rights—A Civil Law
Concept, 50 LOY. L. REV. 349 (2004).
61. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987).
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owned, the rhetorical power of property discourse within liberal
society is such that fine gradations are difficult to sustain against it.
Consider the popular notion of “identity theft.”62 The language
of property is more viscerally evocative in modern Western society
than alternative terms like “appropriation of personality” (which
itself still echoes property language) or “violation of personality,”
which conceptualize the problem (more naturally) as a personhood
rather than a property issue. The association with theft serves to
patrimonialize identity (itself a slippery concept) into an object of
property and thus to link it to ownership, the most powerful right
in the arsenal of the liberal legal world.
This subtle politics of labeling is closely related to the equally
subtle politics of taxonomy. If we reduce classification at the
interface between persons and things to a question of the scope of
property rights, we create a slippery slope whose bottom is the
position where anything to which the creativity of a marketdominated society can assign a value is brought within the property
regime to be subjected to the full panoply of broad legallyenforced rights of ownership. The category of persons hardly
stands a chance against this–it becomes little more than a
placeholder for things not yet propertized.
Allowing the persons-things interface to become a one-way
membrane that permits only ever-increasing commodification
misses the potential of the other kinds of conceptual exchanges that
might take place between persons and things. Categorization at the
persons-things interface is more than simply coming up with two
definitions, one for persons, another for things, and choosing the
proper pigeonhole in which to file something new. An interface
between categories means that the categories are related to one
another, mutually and on equal terms, and not simply as colonizercolonized. This allows us to see not just how aspects of the person
can function as things, but also how our concept of the person
depends on connections to certain things.
Pushing things further, persons and things are just part of the
analysis: questions of classification really involve all three parts of
the private law–persons, things, and obligations–working together
to set the terms of our interaction with the world and the degree of
62. E.g. Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millenium, 80
OR. L. REV. 1423 (2001); and Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the
Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003).
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influence the world will have on us. Broadening the analysis
beyond a binary opposition–and away from the transactional
overtones of property discourse–allows us to enrich the personsthings interface with the relational concerns characteristic of the
third part of our triangle. I think this allows a better understanding
of the role things play in human relationships and the ways in
which personhood and market concerns interact in defining these
relationships. 63
The standard sites for discussing issues like these are with
respect to the human body and personality rights like privacy. 64
Both of these examples sit squarely in the liminal zone between
persons and things, since they are associated with the human being
but are detachable and so transactable in market terms. At the
same time, they touch on ideas of relationship, interconnection,
and responsibility associated with the language of obligations. A
stark binary choice–person or thing–is unsatisfactory. Market
discourse makes us uncomfortable in this context, since we are
generally unwilling to treat kidneys like automobiles, but at the
same time a kidney is no more a person than Buick is (unless we
are willing to get creative with the fiction of legal personality 65 ).
In a system where the category of persons is rigidly circumscribed
in opposition to things, the taxonomic possibilities for things like
kidneys or one’s image are lacking, and such things have nowhere
to go except somewhere along the property spectrum. And once
classed as things, the assumptions about the property institution
take over, and some degree of market commodification is the
result. 66
The civil law distinction between extrapatrimonial and
patrimonial rights perhaps gets closest to what I mean, since it
distinguishes between the personal aspects of rights (their
63. For interesting insights into this question, see Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1 (1993); and David
Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth,
53 U.T.L.J. 325 (2003).
64. See the literature cited supra note 33.
65. Naffine, supra note 37 (on the different arguments and justifications
behind the idea of legal personality).
66. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property
Law and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1230-31 (1995). I am
more skeptical than Gold about the appropriateness of applying even a changed
property discourse to things intimately connected to the person.
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personhood qualities) and their public aspects (their value- or
market-oriented side). The problem, however, is that concepts like
extrapatrimoniality and “not in commerce” do not do full justice to
what is going on at the persons-things interface, since they already
assume both the language of property discourse and an either/or
view of classification. To address this problem of the insufficiency
of binary choices, various writers have made a case for
intermediate categories–examples include Jean-Pierre Baud’s idea
of “things without price,” or Gérard Farjat’s idea of “centers of
interest,” or Geoffrey Samuel’s work on “interests” in the common
law. 67 Such intermediate categories, these authors argue, could
encompass things like the human body or the family relationship or
even Domat’s monster that do not fit easily elsewhere.
Multiplying categories is not the answer, however, since it
simply adds new boundaries and thus creates new either/or
dilemmas. Nor is it feasible, I think, to abandon categories entirely
and adopt a more pragmatic, situational model of private law in the
manner of the common law, where categories are infinitely
expandable, overlapping, and non-exclusive (as in Halsbury’s
Laws of England 68 or the Canadian Abridgement 69 ). The civil law
comes with a structural history that has become part of the law
itself. This structure can be modified (an example is the
consolidation of family law from elements drawn from persons,
things, and obligations), but the traditional foundation based on
Gaius has proved resilient and of continuing utility.

67. BAUD, supra note 9, at 217-22; Gérard Farjat, Entre les personnes et les
choses, les centres d’intérêts: prolégomènes pour une recherché, 2002
REV.TRIM. DR. CIV. 221; and Geoffrey Samuel, The Notion of an Interest as a
Formal Concept in English and in Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW
BEFORE THE COURTS 263 (Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve
eds., 2004).
68. HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed. 1973). The categories in
Halsbury, of which there is a growing list of more than 160, range from the
highly general (Contract, Tort, Real Property, Restitution) to the narrowly
defined (Agriculture, Animals, Auction, Aviation, Barristers). Overlap is
common: for instance we find both Tort and Negligence, Contract and Sale of
Goods, and so on.
69. CANADIAN ABRIDGEMENT (2d ed. 1992). As with Halsbury, here the
categories are numerous (about one hundred), of varying degrees of generality,
and frequently overlapping (Contract, but also Sale of Land, Insurance,
Employment Law, and so on).
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It seems to me more useful to explore the possibilities of the
idea of interfaces. By this I mean a zone where the categories
mingle and blend: where the linkages between personhood and
property can be articulated while resorting neither to full market
commodification nor to full legal subjectivity. An interface is not
simply a new either/or choice: it is a space where the answer is
“both,” a zone of interaction where either category alone would be
insufficient to deal with the complexities of the subject matter, and
would result in an unacceptable narrowing or distortion of what
was being categorized. This idea of interaction, however, points to
the relational ideas characteristic of the third area of our triangle–
the law of obligations–and indicates that the analysis around the
concepts of persons and things is more complicated than even a
dual persons-things interface alone can capture.
III. BRINGING IN THE PERSONS-OBLIGATIONS INTERFACE
The third category in Gaius’ schema has been the most
obviously fluid both in conceptualization and in content, which is
at least partly due to its role as the legal site for concepts that
mediate between self and society. 70 It represents links or
interactions between persons or things, and so, I would argue,
touches qualities of movement between categories, of moral
engagement, and of relationship.
This category embraces a wide variety of subject matter–Peter
Stein has called obligations the “joker in the pack of civil law
categories” 71 –and this is one reason why it is so difficult to pin
down. The definitional shifts surrounding this category over the
centuries are fascinating, and indicate a searching for a way to
generalize the different possible links between persons and
things: 72 “obligations” looks one way, putting the stress on
interpersonal relations, while “ways of acquiring property” looks
70. KELLEY, supra note 42 at 8 has described it as “the theoretical point
where self-consciousness becomes social consciousness and where the defining
faculty of human will, as expressed in language as well as behavior, becomes
essential both for social activity and for legal regulation.”
71. Stein, supra note 1 at 158.
72. ANDRÉ-JEAN ARNAUD, ESSAI D’ANALYSE STRUCTURALE DU CODE CIVIL
FRANÇAIS: LA RÈGLE DU JEU DANS LA PAIX BOURGEOISE 92 (1973) (making a
similar point with reference to the mixture of subjects found in Book 3 of the
French Code civil).
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another way, emphasizing the relations between persons and
things.
As I have suggested, the traditional linear model of Gaius’
paradigm is misleading, since it relates this third category only
with things, and not with persons. In law persons interact both
with other persons and with things: contracts of sale, lease, and
deposit, for example, involve things (and persons too, of course),
while contracts of mandate, partnership, and employment involve
persons, their status, and their interpersonal relationships much
more than their things. The element common to both is the
creation and governance of relationships.
Viewed broadly, then, this third category brings to the
statically conceived categories of persons and things relationships
and interactions of all kinds: from social or affective relationships
(such as aspects of family), to legal relationships (such as
employer/employee and aspects of parenthood or marriage), to
relationships with things (such as custodial obligations). These
various kinds of interactions, moreover, call attention to qualities
such as affect and power that are crucial to understanding how
legal systems actually function, but that are otherwise missing
from the schema. In short, if we view the category “persons” as
the realm of being and the category “things” as the realm of
having, this third category works with the others to emphasize the
intermediary states of becoming and getting. Brought into the
persons-things mix, this focus on process rather than product
brings into focus moral and ethical aspects of the law that
otherwise tend to remain hidden and so difficult to articulate or
conceptualize, and that work to change the terms of analysis of
both persons and things.
CONCLUSION
To return to the examples with which I began, I think we can
now see more clearly how both the leg in the barbeque smoker and
Domat’s monster challenge the static and linear view of Gaius’
schema. The leg, being too recognizably human to be clearly a
commodity, but at the same time too detached to be clearly a
person, fits neither category and so engages neither set of rules
unproblematically. As for monsters without human form, although
Domat clearly excludes such beings from the category of persons,
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we see that it is precisely the human qualities they do have
(particularly their parentage, but also any physical resemblance to
humans) that keep them from fitting clearly into the category of
things. Similarly, their lack of most of the usual formal attributes
of humanity keeps them out of the category of persons: only in
cases where such monsters have a sufficiently human form do they
become persons. 73 Their connection with each category–persons
and things–is however colored by their interactions: with their
parents especially, but also with society generally and with the
assumptions of others about their nature, their abilities, and their
origins. And it is these interactions, with their overtones of duty,
responsibility, and obligation, that really add complexity–but also
interest–to the problem of Domat’s monster.
Though Domat’s treatment of the monster would not be the
way we would discuss this issue today, his recognition of the
interplay between form, nature, and particularly community is an
excellent illustration of the issues that categorization in law must
engage. Taxonomy is a necessary evil in law, but how we do it is
anything but necessary and need not be evil. Categories shape the
material being categorized, and discrete, coherent, and bounded
categories invite us to view persons and things as themselves
discrete, coherent, and bounded, though the richness of human
experience says otherwise. Moving beyond the limitations of this
view of taxonomy and emphasizing instead fluidity and interaction
can help us embrace rather than avoid complexity and
multivalence in legal analysis, whether we are dealing with
intangibles like the right to privacy or very tangible things like legs
discovered in barbeque smokers.

73. This pre-modern emphasis on the formal rather than the moral or other
characteristics of humanity is interesting historically, though shocking in
modern ethical terms. It is however disquieting to compare the often alarming
rhetoric surrounding conjoined twins cited in DREGER, supra note 20.

